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Abstract. From 26.08. to 30.08.2007, the Dagstuhl Seminar 07351 For-
mal Models of Belief Change in Rational Agents was held in the Interna-
tional Conference and Research Center (IBFI), Schloss Dagstuhl. During
the seminar, several participants presented their current research, and
ongoing work and open problems were discussed. Abstracts of the pre-
sentations given during the seminar as well as abstracts of seminar results
and ideas are put together in this paper. The ﬁrst section describes the
seminar topics and goals in general. Links to extended abstracts or full
papers are provided, if available.
Keywords. Belief change, rational agents, information economy, infor-
mation processing
07351 Executive Summary  Formal Models of Belief
Change in Rational Agents
From August 26, 2007 to August 30, 2007, the Dagstuhl Seminar 07351 "For-
mal Models of Belief Change in Rational Agents" was held at the International
Conference and Research Center (IBFI), Schloss Dagstuhl. During the seminar,
several participants presented their current research, and ongoing work and open
problems were discussed.
The Executive Summary describes the seminar topics and goals in general.
Abstracts of the presentations given during the seminar as well as abstracts of
seminar results and ideas are put together in the Proceedings. Links to extended
abstracts or full papers are provided, if available.
Keywords: Belief revision, iterated belief revision, update, merging, dynamic
logic, epistemic logic, conditionals, social choice, game theory
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Joint work of: Bonanno, Giacomo; Delgrande, James; Lang, Jérôme; Rott,
Hans
Extended Abstract: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1201
A logical formalism for the subjective approach in a
multi-agent setting
Guillaume Aucher (IRIT - Toulouse, F)
Representing an epistemic situation involving several agents depends very much
on the modeling point of view one takes. In fact, the interpretation of a formalism
relies quite a lot on the nature of this modeling point of view. Classically, in
epistemic logic, the models built are supposed to represent the situation from
an external and objective point of view. We call this modeling approach the
objective approach. In this paper, we study the modeling point of view of a
particular agent involved in the situation with other agents. We propose a logical
formalism based on epistemic logic that this agent can use to represent `for
herself' the surrounding world. We call this modeling approach the subjective
approach. We then set some formal connections between the subjective approach
and the objective approach. Finally we axiomatize our logical formalism and
show that the resulting logic is decidable.
Keywords: Epistemic logic, multi-agent system
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1200
Iterated Dynamic Revision of Multi-Agent Higher-Level
Beliefs: A Semantic Approach
Alexandru Baltag (Oxford University, GB)
I present a semantic, qualitative approach, in the tradition of Dynamic-Epistemic
Logic (DEL), to the problem of (iterating) dynamic belief revision of multi-agent
higher-level beliefs (i.e. beliefs, not only about ontic facts, but also about other
agents' beliefs etc). This presentation is primarily based on my own work with S.
Smets, and on J. van Benthem's closely related work, but it is also connected to
other DEL-based approaches to belief revision, by G. Aucher, H. van Ditmarsch
and others.
There are seven main ingredients that are combined in this approach.
The ﬁrst is the distinction (clearly formulated by J. van Benthem and simul-
taneously by Baltag and Smets, but anticipated by others) between static" and
dynamic" belief revision, distinction of primary importance when dealing with
higher-level beliefs.
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The second ingredient is the well-known semantic representation (due, in
various forms, to Lewis, Grove and Spohn) of conditional (i.e. revisable) beliefs
in terms of plausibility-ordered models.
The third ingredient is the idea that a complete belief revision theory should
deal, not only with the revision of beliefs", but also with revising other doxastic
attitudes": conditional belief, knowledge, safe belief", entrenched (or strong")
belief etc. Formalizing this idea gives rise to a number of complete modal logics,
with modalities for each type of doxastic attitude.
The fourth ingredient is the idea that new information does not come only in
propositional form, but also in dynamic form: besides the propositional content
of learning, there are the speciﬁc informational-doxastic aspects of the learning
action itself. In other words, dynamic belief revision is not simply triggered
by learning propositions", but by the speciﬁc doxastic events" through which
learning is achieved: e.g. hard" (inherently truthful) public announcements,
soft" (inherently believable) announcements, secret" learning (whose possibility
is unsuspected by outsiders), legal" private learning (commonly known to be
possible, although its content is private) etc.
The ﬁfth ingredient (ﬁrst introduced by G. Aucher and H. van Ditmarsch,
as an adaptation to belief revision of the DEL approach of Baltag, Moss and
Solecki) consists of modeling (the informational-doxastic features of) these var-
ious learning events using the same type of (plausibility-ordered) models that
were used to represent static beliefs.
The sixth ingredient (due to Baltag and Smets) is the Action-Priority" Rule,
an update rule giving the simplest and most convincing generalization of AGM-
type revision to arbitrary doxastic events.
Finally, the last ingredient consists of using a Dynamic Logic syntax, and
so-called Reduction Axions", to formalize and completely axiomatize various
logics for dynamic revision of (multi-agent higher-level) doxastic attitudes.
Keywords: Dynamic belief revision, plausibility models, action models, dynamic
logic, modal logic
Enhanced Contractions and (In)dependence
Alexander Bochman (Holon Academic Inst. of Techn., IL)
We introduce a number of contraction operations that allow us to preserve more
information in the process of belief contraction and revision of our epistemic
states. One of them, choice contraction, will be argued to characterise basic
(in)dependence relations among propositions belonging to the epistemic state.
Keywords: Contractions, dependence
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1204
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Semantic structures for one-stage and iterated belief
revision
Giacomo Bonanno (Univ. of California at Davis, USA)
Semantic structures for belief revision and iterated belief revision are proposed.
We start with one-stage revision structures that generalize the notion of choice
function from rational choice theory. A correspondence between these one-stage
structures and AGM belief revision functions is established. We then add branch-
ing time and consider more general structures that accommodate iterated revi-
sion. AGM temporal belief revision structures are deﬁned and a syntactic ax-
iomatization is provided.
Keywords: Iterated belief revision, choice functions, Kripke semantics, branch-
ing time, modal logic
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1205
Equilibrium in social contraction
Richard Booth (Mahasarakham University - Thailand, SAS)
In a previous work we introduced *social contraction* operators as an interme-
diate stage in deﬁning multi-agent belief merging operators, the idea being each
agent manipulates their beliefs into a form in which they may be consistently
conjoined. One notion which traditionally plays a prominent role in studies of
multi-agent interaction is that of *equilibrium*.
We look at one way to describe what it means for the outcome of a social
contraction operation to be in equilibrium. For this we assume each agent comes
equipped with its own individual belief *removal* operation. Then, roughly,
an equilibrium outcome is one which results from every agent simultaneously
removing exactly enough beliefs to be consistent with all the others. Under this
notion, we may examine questions such as: Are such equilibria always guaranteed
to exist? And, if yes how do we ﬁnd them? We also show how this notion of
equilibrium may be seen as a generalisation of the notion of maximally consistent
subsets of agents.
Keywords: Merging, social contraction, equilibrium, belief removal
Defeasible Acceptance, Assumptions, and Conditionals
John Cantwell (KTH Stockholm, S)
A theory of defeasible acceptance is presented with the ambition to capture
acceptance conditions appropriate for the indicative conditional.
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A central component of the theory is the separation of the role of what
is accepted and what is assumed and an analysis of the relationship between
propositions that are accepted and propositions that are assumed. Soundness
and completeness results are presented for a non-bivalent semantics. A general
characterisation is also given in the form of plausibility functions.
Belief Change and Cryptographic Protocol Veriﬁcation
James Delgrande (Simon Fraser University, CA)
Cryptographic protocols are structured sequences of messages that are used for
exchanging information in a hostile environment. Many protocols have epistemic
goals: a successful run of the protocol is intended to cause a participant to hold
certain beliefs. As such, epistemic logics have been employed for the veriﬁcation
of cryptographic protocols. Although this approach to veriﬁcation is explicitly
concerned with changing beliefs, formal belief change operators have not been
incorporated in previous work.
In this paper, we introduce a new approach to protocol veriﬁcation by com-
bining a monotonic logic with a non-monotonic belief change operator. In this
context, a protocol participant is able to retract beliefs in response to new in-
formation and a protocol participant is able to postulate the most plausible
event explaining new information. We illustrate that this kind of reasoning is
particularly important when protocol participants have incorrect beliefs.
Keywords: Belief change, belief evolution, cryptographic protocol veriﬁcation
Joint work of: Hunter, Aaron; Delgrande, James
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1206
Judgment aggregation and multi-agent belief revision
Daniel Eckert (Universität Graz, A)
Relations between belief revision and the aggregation of preferences or judgments
have long been noted (see e.g. Kﬁr-Dahav and Tennenholtz 1996, Konieczny and
Pino Peres 2002, Gabbay, Pigozzi and Rodriguez 2006).
This note extends on a recent result by Christian List (2007) on multi-agent
belief revision in the framework of judgment aggregation. In this framework the
dictatorship result for judgment aggregation functions translates into the impos-
sibility of a non-trivial multi-agent belief revision function under even weaker
conditions than those in the spirit of Arrovian social choice.
Keywords: Judgment aggregation, multi-agent belief revision
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Propositional Merging Operators based on Set-Theoretic
Closeness
Patricia Everaere (Université d'Artois - Lens, F)
Belief merging operators aim at deﬁning the beliefs/goals of a group of agents
from a proﬁle of bases, gathering the beliefs/goals of each member of the group.
In the propositional setting, a widely studied family of merging operators are the
distance-based ones: the models of the merged base are the interpretations con-
sidered as close as possible to the given proﬁle; closeness is often measured as a
number resulting from the aggregation of the distances to each base of the given
proﬁle. In this work we propose a new familly of propositional merging operators,
close to such distance-based merging operators, but relying on a set-theoretic
deﬁnition of closeness, namely the diﬀ measure already at work in sev- eral revi-
sion/update operators from the literature. We study a speciﬁc merging operator
of this family, obtained by considering set product as the aggregation function.
We focus on three important criteria: logical properties, strategy-proofness and
complexity.
Keywords: Intelligence artiﬁcial, logic, merging, set of conﬂict
Joint work of: Everaere, Patricia; Konieczny, Sébastien; Marquis, Pierre
Isn't it time to apply belief revision?
Randy Goebel (University of Alberta, CA)
The study of belief revision has continued to elaborate a theoretical framework
for understand belief accumulation, but hasn't had much impact in practical
applications. We present some application problems which could feasibly beneﬁt
from belief revision theories, and oﬀer back application constraints that stretch
those theories. Among the issues revealed include the need for resource con-
strained reasoning, and a demand for further work on the trade oﬀs between
maintaining belief ﬂocks. Application areas include online data mining of data
streams, and software engineering revision management.
Keywords: Belief revision applications
Optimal Regression for Reasoning about Knowledge and
Actions
Andreas Herzig (IRIT - Toulouse, F)
We show how in the propositional case both Reiter's and Scherl & Levesque's so-
lutions to the frame problem can be modelled in dynamic epistemic logic (DEL),
and provide an optimal regression algorithm for the latter.
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Our method is as follows: we extend Reiter's framework by integrating ob-
servation actions and modal operators of knowledge, and encode the resulting
formalism in DEL with announcement and assignment operators.
By extending Lutz' recent satisﬁability-preserving reduction to our logic, we
establish optimal decision procedures for both Reiter's and Scherl & Levesque's
approaches: satisﬁability is NP-complete for one agent, PSPACE-complete for
multiple agents and EXPTIME-complete when common knowledge is involved.
Keywords: Reasoning about action and change, reasoning about knowledge,
situation calculus, frame problem, dynamic epistemic logic
Joint work of: van Ditmarsch, Hans; Herzig, Andreas; de Lima, Tiago
See also: Proc. AAAI 2007
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1207
A conceptual framework for revision, update, and
nonmonotonic reasoning
Gabriele Kern-Isberner (Universität Dortmund, D)
It is well-known in the NMR & BR community that belief revision, belief update
and default inference are closely related operations (referred to as belief opera-
tions in the following), and that there are lots of similarities between them, but
also subtle or crucial diﬀerences. Axiomatic frameworks have been set up for
each of these operations which help clarifying characteristics, but which, e.g.,
also stress the importance of distinguishing between revision and update. The
human mind, however, seems to adopt and use new (even uncertain) information
quite easily, without complicate analyses which operation is the most appropri-
ate.
The point this talk aims to make is that human beings may realize all be-
lief operations by making use of one basic belief change operation in diﬀerent
ways. This would explain similarities as well as diﬀerences between the belief
operations, and provide the grounds for a really unifying approach to belief
change and default reasoning. A methodological framework for all belief oper-
ations will be sketched, together with some basic postulates for belief change
and nonmonotonic reasoning. Moreover, an example of a powerful belief change
operator in a probabilistic environment will be presented.
Keywords: Conceptual framework, belief revision, iterated revision, belief up-
date, nonmonotonic reasoning
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1208
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A conceptual framework for (iterated) revision, update,
and nonmonotonic reasoning
Gabriele Kern-Isberner (Universität Dortmund, D)
This paper makes a foundational contribution to the discussions on the very na-
ture of belief change operations. Belief revision and belief update are investigated
within an abstract framework of epistemic states and (qualitative or quantita-
tive) conditionals. Moreover, we distinguish between background knowledge and
contextual information in order to analyse belief change more appropriately. The
rich epistemic representation framework allows us to make a clear conceptual dis-
tinction between revision and update on the one side, while revealing structural
similarities on the other side. We propose generic postulates for revision and up-
date that also apply to iterated change. Furthermore, we complete the unifying
picture by introducing universal inference operations as a proper counterpart in
nonmonotonic reasoning to iterated belief change.
Keywords: Belief revision, belief update, nonmonotonic inference, epistemic
states, conditionals
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1208
Inconsistency Measures and their Application to Belief
Change
Sebastien Konieczny (Université d'Artois - Lens, F)
This talk is about inconsistency measures. We recall the two main families of
inconsistency measures and show their respectives weaknesses. Then we intro-
duce Shapley Inconsistency Measures (SIV), that allow to express how much
inconsistency brings each formula of a belief base. This also allows to deﬁne in-
consistency measures for belief bases that take both into account the distribution
of the conﬂicts amongst the formulae of the base, but also the proportion of the
language concerned by the inconsistencies. We then explain how such measures
can be used for reasoning tasks, and more speciﬁcally for belief change opera-
tors: we focus on inference relations, belief revision, belief merging, conciliation
(negotiation) operators.
Keywords: Inconsistency measures, paraconsistent logics, belief change, rea-
soning under inconsistencies
From belief change to preference change
Jérôme Lang (IRIT - Toulouse, F)
There is a huge literature on belief change. In contrast, preference change has
been considered only in a few recent papers.
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There are reasons for that: while there is to some extent a general agreement
about the very meaning of belief change, this is deﬁnitely not so for preference
change. We discuss here the possible meanings of preference change, arguing that
we should at least distinguish between four paradigms: preferences evolving after
some new fact has been learned, preferences evolving as a result of an evolution
of the world, preferences evolving after the rational agent itself evolves, and pref-
erences evolving per se. We then develop in more detail the ﬁrst of these four
paradigms (which we think is the most natural). We give some natural proper-
ties that we think preference change should fulﬁll and deﬁne several families of
preference change operators, parameterized by a revision function on epistemic
states and a semantics for interpreting preferences over formulas.
Keywords: Beliefs, preferences, decision making, agents, preference revision
Joint work of: Lang, Jérôme; van der Torre, Leon
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1209
Why Indeterminacy in Probability Judgment?
Isaac Levi (Columbia Univ. - New York, USA)
When an agent fails to rule out probability distributions as permissible to use in
assessing expected utility, the agent is in a state of doubt or suspense concerning
probability judgment. Such doubt diﬀers from doubt concerning judgments of
truth as in states of full belief.
Keywords: Doubt, suspense, probability judgment, serious possibility, permis-
sibility, consensus
Probability Logic and Logical Probability
Isaac Levi (Columbia Univ. - New York, USA)
Authors like Keynes, H. Jeﬀreys and Carnap advocated using a concept of "log-
ical probability". Logical probability had the following properties: (a) it was
representable as a function from potential states of full belief (or "evidence") to
states of subjective or credal probability judgment. (b) Such functions were al-
leged to be constrained by principles of probability logic. (c) All rational agents
were supposed to be obliged to adopt the standard function that probability
logic prescribed. In this essay, it is argued that these three requirements could
be satisﬁed only if probability logic prescribed that credal probability should be
numerically determinate. Keynes denied that it should numerically determinate
and Carnap abandoned the idea that probability logic could supply a determi-
nate function from states of full belief to numerically determinate credal states
that all rational agents ought to adopt. The paper explains that once this is
conceded, logical probability ought to be interpreted rather diﬀerently than it is
customarily is.
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Keywords: Probability, full belief, logic, evidence
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1210
Character and Coherence - Belief Dynamics as a Guide for
Modelling in Ethics
Guido Löhrer (Universität Bern, CH)
Revising moral beliefs is a fundamental operation in ethicis. Revisions of moral
beliefs are generally considered to require one ﬁxed point of reference: that is, a
stable moral character of the person revising his or her moral beliefs. Without
this requirement, these alterations of beliefs, decisions and actions could not be
seen as accountable in respect to the persons in question. Thus, meta-ethical gen-
eralists on the one hand, and particularists on the other, argue that ﬁxed moral
principles, (i.e. a ﬁxed moral sensitivity), are constitutive to character stability.
Both positions see moral rightness in the sense of synchronic coherency of lower
moral beliefs, (e.g. maxims), as the goal of the revision of moral beliefs. The
critical ﬁndings are that the static ability to always be right in moral issues does
not form a moral character capable of exceptional imputation. Therefore, this
article argues ﬁrst of all that character stability should be seen as a diachronic
coherency of our moral beliefs. Secondly, it argues for a point of view that sees
iterative revisions of moral beliefs not only as constituted in accordance to moral
principles, but that these revisions inﬂuence the respective moral principles, an
inﬂuence that can also lead to moderate changes of these principles. The ﬁnal
point of argument will discuss the strategies by which such revisions should take
place.
Revisionen moralischer Überzeugungen erfordern nach allgemeiner Auﬀas-
sung einen festen Bezugspunkt: einen stabilen moralischen Charakter der um-
denkenden Personen. Andernfalls können diesen ihre Überzeugungen, Entschei-
dungen und Handlungen nicht zugerechnet werden. So lehren metaethische Gen-
eralisten einerseits und Partikularisten andererseits, für Charakterstabilität seien
ﬁxe Moralprinzipien bzw. eine ﬁxe moralische Feinfühligkeit konstitutiv. Beiden
Positionen zufolge zielen Revisionen auf moralische Richtigkeit im Sinne syn-
chroner Kohärenz niedrigstuﬁger moralischer Überzeugungen (z.B. Maximen).
Der kritische Befund: Das statische Vermögen, in moralischen Dingen immer
richtig zu liegen, bildet keine einer besonderen Zurechnung fähigen moralis-
chen Charaktere aus; das dynamische Vermögen, sich selber auf angemessene
Weise korrigieren zu können, dagegen wohl. Darum argumentiert der Beitrag
erstens dafür, Charakterstabilität als diachrone Kohärenz unserer moralischen
Überzeugungen aufzufassen. Zweitens wird für eine Sicht plädiert, nach der iter-
ative Revisionen moralischer Überzeugungen nicht nur Moralprinzipien gemäß
vorgenommen werden, sondern diese auch aﬃzieren und deren maßvolle Verän-
derung nach sich ziehen können. Zuletzt wird diskutiert, nach welchen Strategien
sich Revisionen dieser Art vollziehen sollten.
Keywords: Coherence, radical vs. moderate revision
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Propositional Relevance through Letter-Sharing: Review
and Contribution
David Makinson (London School of Economics, GB)
The concept of relevance between classical propositional formulae, deﬁned in
terms of letter-sharing, has been around for a very long time. But it began to take
on a fresh life in 1999 when it was reconsidered in the context of the logic of belief
change. Two new ideas appeared in independent work of Odinaldo Rodrigues
and Rohit Parikh. First, the relation of relevance was considered modulo the
belief set under consideration, Second, the belief set was put in a canonical
form, known as its ﬁnest splitting. In this paper we explain these ideas; relate
the approaches of Rodrigues and Parikh to each other; and brieﬂy report some
recent results of Kourousias and Makinson on the extent to which AGM belief
change operations respect relevance. Finally we suggest a further reﬁnement
of the notion of relevance by introducing a parameter that allows one to take
epistemic as well as purely logical components into account.
Keywords: Belief change, relevance, letter-sharing, splitting
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1212
Forgetting and Update  an exploration
Abhaya Nayak (Macquarie Univ. - Sydney, AU)
Knowledge Update (respectively Erasure) and Forgetting are two very diﬀerent
concepts, with very diﬀerent underlying motivation. Both are tools for knowl-
edge management; however while the former is meant for accommodating new
knowledge into a knowledge corpus, the latter is meant for modifying  in fact
reducing the expressivity  of the underlying language. In this paper we show
that there is an intimate connection between these two concepts: a particular
form of knowledge update and literal forgetting are inter-deﬁnable. This con-
nection is exploited to enhance both our understanding of update as well as
forgetting in this paper.
Keywords: Knowledge Update, Erasure, Forgetting, Dalal Distance, Winslett
Distance
Joint work of: Nayak, Abhaya; Chen, Yin; Lin, Fangzhen
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1213
A Method for Reasoning about other Agents' Beliefs from
Observations
Alexander Nittka (Universität Leipzig, D)
Traditional work in belief revision deals with the question of what an agent
should believe upon receiving new information.
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We will give an overview about what can be concluded about an agent based
on an observation of its belief revision behaviour. The observation contains par-
tial information about the revision inputs received by the agent and its beliefs
upon receiving them. We will sketch a method for reasoning about past and fu-
ture beliefs of the agent and predicting which inputs it accepts and rejects. The
focus of this talk will be on diﬀerent degrees of incompleteness of the observation
and variants of the general question we are able to deal with.
Keywords: Belief revision, iterated revision, non-prioritised revision, non-
monotonic reasoning, rational closure, rational explanation
Joint work of: Nittka, Alexander; Booth, Richard
Extended Abstract: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1214
Distance Semantics for Relevance-Sensitive Belief Revision
Pavlos Peppas (University of Patras, GR)
Parikh's axiom (P) for relevance-sensitive belief revision is studied. Sound and
complete semantics for axiom (P) is provided in the form constraints on system-
of-spheres.
Keywords: Belief Revision, System of Spheres
Joint work of: Peppas, Pavlos; Chopra, Samir; Foo, Norman
Extended Abstract: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1215
See also: P. Peppas, S. Chopra, and N. Foo, Distance Semantics for Relevance-
Sensitive Belief Revision, Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on the
Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning, Whistler, AAAI Press,
2004
Minimal Change
Laurent Perrussel (IRIT - Toulouse, F)
Most of the belief revision and update operators are based on a minimal change
postulate. This postulate states that the resulting belief base should be as closer
as possible of the initial belief base. This closeness notion entails a notion of
distance between belief bases. In order to deﬁne such distances, Dalal has pro-
posed a criterion based on the number of propositional symbols that have change
they truth values. However, it could be that changing one symbol may lead to
signiﬁcant change if this symbol frequently appears in the clauses of the initial
belief base.
In this talk, we propose to represent the belief base in conjunctive and dis-
junctive normal forms in order to represent prime implicants and implicates.
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Based on the conjunctive and disjunctive normal forms and an explicit link be-
tween literal and prime implicates, we propose a new change metric based on
the numbers of prime implicates that are unchanged when a new information
is inserted. This new notion of minimal change enables to revisit existing belief
change operators and to propose new change operators which reﬂects our notion
of minimal change.
Joint work of: Marchi, Jerusa; Perrussel, Laurent; Bittencourt, Guilherme
Premise Independence in Judgment Aggregation
Gabriella Pigozzi (University of Luxemburg, L)
Judgment aggregation studies how agent opinions on logically interconnected
propositions can be mapped into a collective judgment on the same propositions,
and is plagued by impossibility results.
In this paper we study the central notion of independence in these impos-
sibility results. First, we argue that the distinction between the premises and
conclusions play an important role in the benchmark examples of judgment ag-
gregation. Second, we consider the notion of independence in judgment aggre-
gation frameworks, and we observe that the distinction between premises and
conclusion is not taken into account. Third, based on our analysis, we introduce
independence assumptions that distinguish premises from conclusion.
We show that, by introducing new operators that satisfy our independence
assumptions, the problematic impossibility results no longer hold.
Keywords: Judgment aggregation, social choice theory
Joint work of: Pigozzi, Gabriella; van der Torre, Leendert
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1216
Multiple Contraction: State of the Art and Future Works
Mauricio Reis (University of Madeira - Funchal, P)
We survey the existing approaches on multiple contraction and present our plan
for future research topics on this subject.
Joint work of: Reis, Maurício; Fermé, Eduardo
Connections between belief revision, belief merging and
voting
Odinaldo Rodrigues (King's College - London, GB)
In this paper, we consider a number of diﬀerent ways of reasoning about voting
as a problem of conciliating contradictory interests.
14 G. Bonanno, J. Delgrande, J. Lang and H. Rott
The mechanisms that do the reconciliation are belief revision and belief merg-
ing. By investigating the relationship between diﬀerent voting strategies and
their associated counterparts in revision theory, we ﬁnd that whereas the count-
ing mechanism of the voting process is more easily done at the meta-level in
belief merging, it can be brought to the object level in base revision. In the
former case, the counting can be tweaked according to the aggregation proce-
dure used, whereas in base revision, we can only rely on the notion of minimal
change and hence the syntactical representation of the voters' preferences plays
a crucial part in the process. This highlights the similarities between the revision
approaches on the one hand and voting on the other, but also opens up a number
of interesting questions.
Keywords: Belief revision, belief merging, social choice, voting problem
Joint work of: Gabbay, Dov; Pigozzi, Gabriella; Odinaldo Rodrigues
Common Foundations for belief revision, belief merging
and voting
Odinaldo Rodrigues (King's College - London, GB)
In this paper, we consider a number of diﬀerent ways of reasoning about voting
as a problem of conciliating contradictory interests. The mechanisms that do
the reconciliation are belief revision and belief merging. By investigating the
relationship between diﬀerent voting strategies and their associated counterparts
in revision theory, we ﬁnd that whereas the counting mechanism of the voting
process is more easily done at the meta-level in belief merging, it can be brought
to the object level in base revision. In the former case, the counting can be
tweaked according to the aggregation procedure used, whereas in base revision,
we can only rely on the notion of minimal change and hence the syntactical
representation of the voters' preferences plays a crucial part in the process. This
highlights the similarities between the revision approaches on the one hand and
voting on the other, but also opens up a number of interesting questions.
Keywords: Belief revision, belief merging, voting, social choice theory
Joint work of: Gabbay, Dov; Pigozzi, Gabriella; Odinaldo, Rodrigues
Extended Abstract: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1217
Two-Dimensional Belief Change
Hans Rott (Univ. of Regensburg, D)
The idea of two-dimensional belief change operators is that a belief state is
transformed by an input sentence A in such a way that A gets accepted with at
least the strength or certainty of a sentence B (the reference sentence).
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The input of such a transformation may alternatively be conceived as `B ≤
A' [`B less-than-or-equal-to A']. This notation makes explicit that the process
induced is basically one of doxastic preference change. The principal case of two-
dimensional belief change obtains when B is a prior belief which is more strongly
accepted than both A and ¬A, but the non-principal cases are interesting in their
own right. Various two-dimensional revision operators were studied by Cantwell
(1997, `raising' and `lowering'), Fermé and Rott (2003, `revision by comparison'),
and Rott (2007, `bounded revision'). Special choices of a ﬁxed input sentence
A or a ﬁxed reference sentence B lead to some well-known unary oparators of
belief change: `irrevocable' (aka `radical') revision, `severe withdrawal' (aka `mild
contraction'), `natural' (aka `conservative') and `lexicographic' (aka `moderate')
revision. The talk gives a survey of several variants of two-dimensional belief
change and their representations. I argue that two-dimensional belief change
operators oﬀer an interesting qualitative model with an expressive power between
(all too poor) unary operators and (all too demanding) quantitative models of
belief change.
Keywords: Belief revision, radical revision, conservative revision, moderate re-
vision, severe withdrawal, preference change, qualitative vs. quantitative change
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1240
See also: John Cantwell, 'On the Logic of Small Changes in Hypertheories',
Theoria 63 (1997), 54-89. Eduardo Fermé and Hans Rott, 'Revision by Com-
parison', Artiﬁcial Intelligence 157 (2004), 5-47. Hans Rott, 'Revision by Com-
parison as a Unifying Framework: Severe Withdrawal, Irrevocable Revision and
Irrefutable Revision', Theoretical Computer Science 355 (2006), 228-242. ,
'Shifting Priorities: Simple Representations for Twenty-seven Iterated Theory
Change Operators', in: Modality Matters: Twenty-Five Essays in Honour of
Krister Segerberg, eds. Henrik Lagerlund et al., Uppsala Philosophical Studies,
Vol. 53, Uppsala Universitet 2006, pp. 359-384. , 'Bounded Revision: Two-
Dimensional Belief Change Between Conservatism and Moderation', in: Hom-
mage à Wlodek. Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz, eds.
Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen et al., Lunds Universitet 2007, http://www.ﬁl.lu.se/
hommageawlodek/site/papper/RottHans.pdf .
A blueprint for deontic logic in three (not necessarily
easy) steps
Krister Segerberg (Uppsala University, S)
The famous AGM paradigm for the analysis of theory change drew its inspiration
from two sources: belief change and norm change. But very early on, interest
in the former eclipsed the interest in the latter. Now, many years later, it is
appropriate once again to raise the question about norm change. In the authors
terminology, given the current work in Dynamic Doxastic Logic, what might
Dynamic Deontic Logic look like?
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Keywords: Belief change, norm change, Dynamic Doxastic Logic, Dynamic
Deontic Logic
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1218
Dynamic Interactions Between Goals and Beliefs
Steven Shapiro (University of Toronto, CA)
Shapiro et al. [2005], presented a framework for representing goal change in the
situation calculus. In that framework, agents adopt a goal when requested to
do so (by some agent reqr), and they remain committed to the goal unless the
request is cancelled by reqr. A common assumption in the agent theory literature,
is that achievement goals that are believed to be impossible to achieve should
be dropped. In this paper, we incorporate this assumption into Shapiro et al.'s
framework, however we go a step further. If an agent believes a goal is impossible
to achieve, it is dropped. However, if the agent later believes that it was mistaken
about the impossibility of achieving the goal, the agent might readopt the goal. In
addition, we consider an agent's goals as a whole when making them compatible
with their beliefs, rather than considering them individually.
Keywords: Goal Change, Belief Change, Situation Calculus
Joint work of: Shapiro, Steven; Brewka, Gerhard
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1199
Full Paper:
http://www.ijcai.org/papers07/Papers/IJCAI07-422.pdf
See also: Steven Shapiro and Gerhard Brewka: Dynamic Interactions between
Goals and Beliefs. In Manuela M. Veloso, ed.: Proceedings of the 20th Interna-
tional Joint Conference on Artiﬁcial Intelligence, 2625-2630.
Measuring Ranks via the Complete Laws of Iterated
Contraction
Wolfgang Spohn (Universität Konstanz, D)
Ranking theory delivers an account of iterated contraction; each ranking function
induces a speciﬁc iterated contraction behavior. The paper gives a complete ax-
iomatization of that behavior, i.e., a complete set of laws of iterated contraction.
And it shows how to reconstruct a ranking function from its iterated contraction
behavior uniquely up to multiplicative constant and thus how to measure ranks
on a ratio scale.
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1239
Formal Models of Belief Change in Rational Agents 17
Ranking Revision Reloaded
Emil Weydert (University of Luxemburg, L)
We propose a belief revision strategy which, in a nutshell, combines an exten-
sion of Spohn's ranking-based revision with Lehmann's sequential belief change
philosophy. Epistemic states are sequences consisting of a prior ranking measure
and a sequence of ranking constraint sets, from which the actual belief valuation
is extracted through a sophisticated iterated JLZ-shifting procedure. Revision is
just concatenation. This is an instance of the epistemic projection paradigm.
Keywords: Ranking measures, iterated belief revision
Extended Abstract: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1202
The Logic of Bargaining: a Survey of Belief-Revision-Based
Bargaining Theory
Dongmo Zhang (Univ. of Western Sydney, AU)
This paper provides a survey of belief-revision-based bargaining theory. We shall
show how the AGM theory can be used to contribute a solution to the bargaining
problem. A solution to the n-person bargaining problem is presented based on the
maxmin rule over the degrees of bargainers' satisfaction. The solution is uniquely
characterized by four axioms: collective rationality, scale invariance, symmetry
and mutually comparable monotonicity in conjunction with three other funda-
mental assumptions: individual rationality, consistency and comprehensiveness.
The Pareto eﬃcient solutions are characterized by the axioms: scale invariance,
Pareto optimality and restricted mutually comparable monotonicity along with
the basic assumptions. The relationships of these axioms and assumptions and
their links to belief revision postulates and game theory axioms are discussed.
The framework would help us to identify the logical reasoning behind bargaining
processes and would initiate a new methodology of bargaining analysis.
Keywords: Belief Revision, Bargaining Theory, Game Theory, Mutliagent Sys-
tems
The Logic of Bargaining
Dongmo Zhang (Univ. of Western Sydney, AU)
This paper reexamines the game-theoretic bargaining theory from logic and Ar-
tiﬁcial Intelligence perspectives.
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We present an axiomatic characterization of the logical solutions to bargain-
ing problems. A bargaining situation is described in propositional logic with
numerical representation of bargainers' preferences. A solution to the n-person
bargaining problems is proposed based on the maxmin rule over the degrees
of bargainers' satisfaction. The solution is uniquely characterized by four ax-
ioms collective rationality, scale invariance, symmetry and mutually comparable
monotonicity in conjunction with three other fundamental assumptions individ-
ual rationality, consistency and comprehensiveness. The Pareto eﬃcient solutions
are characterized by the axioms scale invariance, Pareto optimality and restricted
mutually comparable monotonicity along with the basic assumptions. The re-
lationships of these axioms and assumptions and their links to belief revision
postulates and game theory axioms are discussed. The framework would help us
to identify the logical reasoning behind bargaining processes and would initiate
a new methodology of bargaining analysis.
Keywords: Bargaining theory, belief revision, game theory
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1203
Input and Output in Judgment Aggregation
Leon van der Torre (University of Luxemburg, L)
We argue that input and output must be distinguished in judgment aggregation.
Keywords: Judgment aggregation
Joint work of: Pigozzi, Gabriella; van der Torre, Leon
